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Notes
Between Natural Law and Legal
Positivism:
Plato's Minos and the Nature of Law
Claire McCusker*
Plato 's Minos is the only Platonic dialogue in which a character asks the question "What is law? " Yet
the Minos has been largely neglected by modern philosophers of law; indeed, it has been all but ex-
punged from the Platonic corpus due to concerns about its lack of sophistication and coherence. This
Note offers a novel interpretation of the dialogue, demonstrating its coherence and bringing the Minos
back into the clarifying light of scholarship. Moreover, the Note argues that Plato has, through the
person of Socrates in the Minos, suggested a novel account of the nature of law that has the potential
to advance a natural law-legal positivism debate that many have viewed as stalled on semantics. That
is, Plato argues through the Minos for a view of law wherein law aspires to conformity with the true,
but is not always able to achieve that conformity. In arguing for this quasi-natural law view, Plato
develops trenchant critiques ofpositivism not yet answered by modern positivistic philosophers oflaw.
INTRODUCTION
A. The Authorship Question
Of the thirty-six works that come down to us in the Thrasyllan canon,
modern scholarly opinion casts doubt on the Platonic authorship of at least
ten. Among these is the Minos, the only dialogue in the Platonic (or pseu-
do-Platonic) corpus directly to pose the question "What is law [v6ito;]? ''
Unlike the many dialogues that scholars have rejected as spurious for lin-
guistic reasons, the main charge against the Minos seems to be that it is
simply not a good enough dialogue - lacking profundity and grace, and
containing some embarrassingly bad arguments - to be truly Platonic.
* Law clerk to Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
J.D., Yale Law School, 2009. M. Phil., Classics, Trinity College, Cambridge, 2006. Dipl6me
d'Etudes Approfondies, Etudes Politiques, L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2005.
A.B., Government, Harvard University, 2004.
1. PLATO, Minos, in 5 PLATONIS OPERA 313a (1907) (unless otherwise specified, all translations
to the English are my own).
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Loeb translator W.R.M. Lamb mocks its "laboured solemnity," proclaims
that its "sequence of thought is awkward and none too clear," and claims
the dialogue as a whole is "destitute of those graceful or lively touches of
characterization which distinguish [Plato's] first memorials of Socrates. "2
D.S. Hutchinson, in his introduction to a recent translation, observes that
the work, although presumed to be written after the Laws, "adopts an ear-
lier conception of politics."3 William Arthur Heidel, in his Pseudo-
Platonica, explains his decision to cut the Minos from the Platonic corpus
with reference to the "spirit of the Alexandrian age which pervades it," its
"pedantry," and its posing of questions that are "wholly unplatonic."4 And
yet, both Lamb and Hutchinson have praise for the efforts of the "Pseudo-
Platonist," with Lamb calling the dialogue "a fairly able and plausible imi-
tation of Plato's early work"5 and Hutchinson admitting that "the assump-
tions and techniques of argument in Minos are thoroughly Platonic."6
Nonetheless, the total effect of these allegations of inauthenticity has
been to remove the Minos from the clarifying light of scholarship. Al-
though all anthologies of Platonic dialogues that include it take pains to
inform us that the (pseudo-Platonic) Minos is valuable for the study of Pla-
tonism, a cursory search reveals that while over a hundred scholarly ar-
ticles have been published on the Crito in the past thirty years, only a
handful have been published on the Minos.' This deficit should serve as a
catalyst to scholarship, rather than chilling it. So, too, should the fact that a
great many anthologists and scholars dealing with pseudo-Platonica as a
whole have found parts of the Minos "none too clear." The genius of even
indisputably Platonic dialogues is not always readily apparent, as illu-
strated by the 19th century tendency to excise dialogues now thought to be
paradigmatically Platonic from the canon. Consider, for example, re-
nowned 1 9 th century Platonic scholar G.A.F. Ast's proclamation that
"[o]ne who knows the true Plato needs only to read a single page of the
Laws in order to convince himself that it is a fraudulent Plato that he has
2. W.R.M. Lamb, Introduction to the Minos, in 12 PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 386-87 (1979).
3. D.S. Hutchinson, Plato, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 1307 (John M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchin-
son eds., 1997).
4. WILLIAM ARTHUR HEffDEL, PSEUDO-PLATONICA 41 (1896).
5. Lamb, supra note 2, at 386.
6. Hutchinson, supra note 3.
7. They are: CHRISTOPHER BRUELL, Minos, or About Law, in ON THE SOCRATIC EDUCATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE SHORTER SOCRATIC DIALOGUES 7 (1999); Judith Best, What is Law: The Mi-
nos Reconsidered, 8 INTERPRETATION 102 (1980); William S. Cobb, Plato's Minos, 8 ANCIENT PHIL.
187 (1998); V. Bradley Lewis, Plato's Minos: The Political and Philosophical Context of the Problem
of Natural Right, 60 REV. METAPHYSICS 17 (2006); Todd Lindberg, The Oldest Law: Rediscovering
the Minos, 137 TELOS 43 (2007); David Mulroy, The Subtle Artistry ofthe Minos and the Hipparchus,
137 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N 115 (2007); Christopher Rowe, Cleitophon and Minos,
in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF GREEK AND ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 303 (Christopher Rowe & Mal-
colm Schofield eds., 2000); Leo Strauss, On the Minos, in THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
TEN FORGOTTEN SOCRATIC DIALOGUES 67 (Thomas L. Pangle ed., 1987).
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The scholarly status of the Minos - understudied, yet with a claim to
Platonic authorship - thus renders the Minos exciting interpretive territory.
Indeed, the prospective pay-off from redeeming the work - whether by
discovering it to be Platonic or merely by revealing it to possess an inner
coherence of its own - is greater than merely the understanding of one
short dialogue. A rehabilitated Minos could shed light on the Crito, the
Statesman, and especially on the Laws - the dialogue to which it is most
clearly related - to name only the most relevant dialogues.
Further, the Minos has implications not only for the classicist, but for
the modern philosopher of law. Plato's approach to the question of law's
nature in the Minos - and, indeed, throughout his corpus - differs striking-
ly from the approach of modern legal philosophy. As such, the Minos has
the potential both to demonstrate a way of approaching the question
"What is law?" by other than analytic routes and to emphasize that law's
nature cannot be understood without an underlying understanding of the
nature of man. This Note will seek first to provide an exegesis of the Mi-
nos strong enough to redeem it from those critics who deem it spurious
solely on the basis of internal incoherence. Then, it will explain how the
Minos can inform debates in modern philosophy of law both about the na-
ture of law and about how the nature of law is best investigated.
B. Overview of the Dialogue
The Minos is a brief dialogue between Socrates and an unnamed Com-
panion [fnipo]. In the dialogue, the Companion puts forth several posi-
tivist definitions of law, or v6gio - as "those things held customarily" ['t
votRd6gsva], as "the resolution of the city" [86y.a ndkFco],9 and as "polit-
ical opinion" [864a nrotrc]. l  He then undertakes in vain to defend
against Socrates's rival conception of v6goq as possessing the ability to
"discover reality," and hence as more rooted in the natural.
In combating the Companion's legal positivist definition of v6go;, So-
crates puts forth two arguments, a series of extended analogies, and a leng-
thy tribute to King Minos of Crete. The first and last of these come under
harsh criticism from those who think the dialogue spurious, while the
second is largely ignored. Such critics claim that the two arguments fail in
indefensible ways. Heidel goes so far as to say of the second: "The author
8. W.K.C. GUTHRIE, 5 A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY: THE LATER PLATO AND THE
ACADEMY 322 (1978) (quoting J. HARWARD, THE EPINOMIS OF PLATO 34 (1928)). Guthrie also notes
that during the 19t' century, serious doubts, based largely on evaluations of which texts were 'unwor-
thy of the great man,' were cast upon the authenticity of, inter alia, Euthyphro, Apology, Laches, Lysis,
Charmides, Hippias Minor, Menexenus, Meno, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Parmenides, Sophist, Politicus,
Philebus, Critias, and Laws, all of which are now considered integral Platonic texts. W.K.C. GUTHRIE,
4 A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY: PLATO, THE MAN AND HIS DIALOGUES 40 (1975).
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does not even seem to be aware how sophistical this reasoning is."" The
paean to Minos comes under fire as a non-sequitur, 2 a mere excuse for the
Alexandrian pseudo-Platonist to praise kingship extravagantly. The ex-
tended analogies, by contrast, are left to one side as neither wholly new
nor overtly offensive.
This Note, however, will take the position that the extended analogies
section of the dialogue is both the crux of Socrates's argument and the key
to understanding the other two parts of the dialogue; it is in this section
that Socrates develops his conception of the law-giver's art as reflective of
the fact that both man and politics possess unified natures. Further, al-
though Socrates's first two arguments do fail, this Note will argue that
their failures both instruct the reader about the nature of law and point the
reader to the middle extended analogies section where their missing and/or
controversial premises are expounded and ably defended.
Parts I and II of this paper will explore the fallacies in the first and
second arguments respectively and suggest what the author of the dialogue
could be trying to teach us through those arguments' flaws. Part III will
connect the two arguments' failings with the neglected analogies section
that follows them, attempting to show how what was learned from the
failure of the two Socratic arguments is supplemented by the notion of law
put forth by the extended analogies section. Part IV will address the ho-
mage to King Minos of Crete; far from being a non-sequitur, the praise of
Minos and ancient law flows from and extends the concept of law as in-
trinsically connected with the nature of man, rendering the Minos a subtle
and nuanced whole. Finally, the paper will conclude by attempting to syn-
thesize the lessons of the Minos into a teaching on the deficiencies of both
legal positivism and natural law theory.
I. THE LAW-ABIDING AND THE JUST
Let us turn to the first of the two arguments that have so failed to im-
press readers of the Minos. In this argument, Socrates attempts to refute
the Companion's paradigmatically legal positivist statement that v6jtoq is
the resolution of the city [568ygta t6Xcot], 1' and thus, that v61ioq could be
whatever politicians decide.
A. An Untenable Argument: Law-Abidingness and the Good
Critics of the authenticity of the Minos take the first argument to be un-
sound. As we will see, their assessment is correct. The text of the argu-
ment is as follows:
[314D] Socrates: Then, the wise are wise through wisdom?
11. HEIDEL, supra note 4, at 49 n.9.
12. Best, supra note 7, at 103.
13. PLATO, Minos, supra note 1, at 314c -314e5.
[Vol 22:83
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Socrates: And again, the just are just through justice?
Companion: Indeed.
Socrates: And then, the lawful are lawful through law?
Companion: Yes.
Socrates: And the lawless are lawless through lawlessness?
Companion: Yes
Socrates: And the lawful are just?
Companion: Yes.
Socrates: And the lawless are unjust?
Companion: Unjust.
Socrates: Then, justice and law are most noble?
Companion: Just so.
Socrates: And injustice and lawlessness are most base?
Companion: Yes.
Socrates: And the former is the savior of cities and all other things, but the
latter destroys and overthrows them?
Companion: Yes.
Socrates: Thus we must look upon law as something noble, and seek after it
as a good.
Companion: How could this not be so?
The argument begins with a typical Socratic induction: The Companion
is asked and agrees to the statements that the wise are wise by wisdom and
the just by justice.1 4 Socrates then extends the induction to include the
propositions that "the lawful [oi v6gttot] are lawful through law
[v6gtot]"' 5 and that "the lawless [oi 6voitot] are lawless through lawless-
ness [6tvogiat]."' 6 So far, Socrates's argument seems plausible. Socrates
14. Id. at 314c5-7.
15. Id. at 314c7-8.
16. Id. at 314c9-314dl. While the necessary English translation - and even a cursory glance at the
5
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then moves on, however: "And the lawful are just? ... And the lawless are
unjust?"' 7 This third line of questioning is neither necessitated nor sup-
ported by the previous premises. As such, it has no claim to being a legi-
timate conclusion from the first two question-premises of the argument. It
must then be an additional premise, and a controversial one at that. Yet the
Companion agrees without argument, thereby consenting to the eventual
debunking of his view of law.
With the addition of this questionable premise, the rest of the argument
flows validly but bumpily - the Companion, with Socrates's prompting,
agrees that justice (and hence law) is most noble and injustice (and hence
lawlessness) is most base."1 Socrates here proceeds validly by taking the
just and unjust as noble and base respectively - a fairly uncontroversial
additional premise. The presence of law and lawlessness in the argument
seems fair as well, given the previously accepted premises. " The next So-
cratic statement to which the Companion assents, that justice and law
"preserve cities and everything else, while [injustice and lawlessness] de-
stroy and overturn them,"20 is both uncontroversial and superfluous to the
argument as a whole. The result that follows it, that "we must regard law
as something noble, and seek after it as a good,"'" follows directly from
the proposition that law and justice are superlatively noble and beautiful
[KLX1lO'rov]. Socrates has only to finish his reductio: if law is good and
the resolutions of cities are sometimes bad, law cannot simply be the reso-
lution of a city.22 Thinking does not make it so, saith Socrates, even if the
thinker is the city.
Socrates's triumph against v6go as -rt vogt(6 tva, however, relies on
the undemonstrated, unquestioned, and highly controversial assertion that
the law-abiding are just (or, said differently, that the law is noble and fol-
lowing it good). As Socrates has not proved or supported this assertion,
the dialogue's critics are right to question the argument's persuasive pow-
er: while valid, the argument is of very dubious soundness. Indeed, So-
crates's additional premise actually begs the question at hand: positivism's
central tenet is that law's essence qua law is its origin, rather than its con-
nection to the good. Modern philosophers of law, following Joseph Raz,
Greek - seems to denote an imperfect parallel between 'law' on the one hand and 'lawlessness' on the
other, I would argue that this does not invalidate the argument (insofar as it is otherwise valid). Greek
has, of course, no word for 'lawfulness' (such as voplipia, perhaps). If one reads &vogiim in the sense
of 'by being without law,' emphasizing the alpha as privative, a parallel does indeed exist between
v6 lot and 6vopiat.
17. Id.at3l4dl-2.
18. Id.at314d3-5.
19. That is, if lawful men are just, and these lawful, just men are both lawful and just precisely in
virtue of their relation to law and justice, law too must be in accord with justice (and not injustice), and
hence also be noble.
20. PLATO, Minos, supra note I, at 314d5-6.
21. Id.at314d6-8.
22. Id. at 314d9-e5.
[Vol 22:83
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have called this proposition the Sources Thesis. 23 The proposition, by con-
trast, that the validity or essence of law is connected with morality is the
central tenet - commonly referred to as the Overlap Theory - of positiv-
ism's rival school of thought, Natural Law Theory.24 To challenge a legal
positivist definition of law by showing that it is inconsistent with the ma-
jor premise of a rival school of thought is not a very trenchant critique, to
say the least.
It is perhaps worthy of note that the Companion, although never with-
holding assent from any part of the argument, does not seem entirely per-
suaded by the argument either. Thus, when Socrates offers his own coun-
ter-definition of v6goq, as that which "tends to be [0o-6OXEt dvat] a
discovery of reality,"25 the Companion bristles at the degree of objectivity
attributed to law by the formulation and responds, "How then, Socrates, if
law is [9yTiv] the discovery of reality, do we not always use the same laws
about the same things, if we have discovered reality?"26 If he presents
even the rather docile taipoq as not convinced by Socrates's argument,
the dialogue's author cannot expect his readers to be convinced either.
Is there an affirmative defense to be mounted in favor of Socrates's ar-
gument, however? What - if anything - has the argument taught the
ftraipoq or the reader? First, as mentioned above, it has shown that the
Overlap Theory, if true, defeats the Sources Thesis. This, in itself, is not
surprising, perhaps. However, upon examination, we see that it is a very
particular form of the Overlap Theory that is put forth in this argument
and that manages to "vanquish" legal positivism. That is, Socrates's ques-
tionable additional premise has not posited that law itself is just, but rather
that "the law-abiding are just. '2 Curiously, he draws our attention here
not to law itself, but to law-abiding people and their contrary, the law-
23. See Joseph Raz, Legal Positivism and Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND MORALITY, 37, 47-8 (1979) ("A law has a source if its contents and existence can be de-
termined without using moral arguments.... The sources of a law are those facts by virtue of which it
is valid and which identify its content.").
24. The Overlap Theory has found many expressions. Most famous, perhaps, is Augustine's
statement that "An unjust law is no law at all." ST. AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 8
(Thomas Williams trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1993) (388-395). Blackstone held a strong form of the
Overlap Thesis: "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all
times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all
their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original." 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41. Modem natural law theorists have put forth a thinner view of the
Overlap Thesis: "[T]he principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of
'obligation') of positive laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles." JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23-24 (1980). An Overlap Theory of a different color is
found in LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (expounding a procedural Overlap Theory whe-
reby the rule of law is inherently good insofar as it fulfills certain procedural requirements).
25. PLATO, Minos, supra note I, at 315al-2.
26. Id.at315a4-6.
27. Id. at 314d3.
2010]
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less.28
To what end? Socrates's emphasis on law-abiding and lawless citizens -
rather than on particular laws or on Law in the abstract -allows us to use
something familiar to us (law-abiding and lawless people) to reason about
something more foreign (the nature of Law). This is a particularly apt ap-
proach, since the question at the heart of the dialogue-the connection be-
tween law and the good-corresponds with a potential uncertainty about
the connection between law-abidingness and human virtue. That is, the
open question of the nature of law is directly related to the almost equally
open question of the status of the law abiding man. Is the most truly law-
abiding person that specter of the Third Reich who obediently refuses to
stray from the positive law, no matter how unjust? Or, is the law-abiding
man the conscientious objector who follows the law when it is in accord
with justice, but not when it is unjust? 29
Yet, as the syllogism nudges us to realize, despite this apparent ambi-
guity, our tendency is generally to view law-abidingness as a virtue. Or,
perhaps more immediately, to view lawlessness as a vice. When Homer
calls Polyphemos "the monstrous Cyclops lawless of mind,"3 we have an
intuitive sense that the Cyclops is not just physically monstrous, but also
lacking in an essential human virtue. So, even if we are unwilling to grant
a necessary overlap between the legal and the just (and, hence, the noble),
we are perhaps more sympathetic to a potential link between law-
abidingness and justice or nobility.
But of course, once we concede that there is something presumptively
admirable about the lawful man, it is dodging the issue to trace our admi-
ration merely to the virtue of lawfulness. Lawfulness is only, after all, the
habit of following law. If we admire the lawful man, then, we have intel-
lectually obligated ourselves to count adherence to law as a good. There-
fore, we either think that obeying a sovereign's commands is a good thing,
or we think that law is in some way related to the good in and of itself.
The real merit in the argument Socrates offers, then, is that it draws our
attention to the important question of why one follows law. More pointed-
ly, it implicitly challenges the legal positivist - the true adherent of the
Source Thesis, who believes that law is law insofar as it is a command of
the sovereign31 - to explain why we ought to follow the law and why any
28. Id. at 314d4.
29. Interestingly, while the "law-abiding citizen" has positive connotations, neither of the two
figures cut here is particularly appealing. Perhaps this indicates that in order for law-abidingness to be
a virtue, law must gain some validity both from its Source and from its Overlap with the good. That is,
the man who slavishly follows positive law seems a mere sheep, while the man who follows only his
conception of right seems a law unto himself. Perhaps the properly law-abiding man must have alle-
giance both to the good and to the positive law.
30. HOMER, ODYSSEY, ch. 4, line 428 (D.B. Munro & T.W. Allen eds., Oxford Classical Texts
1922).
31. Or, potentially, the command justified by the Rule of Recognition. See generally H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). That is, the Rule of Recognition would need to be finally be
[Vol 22:83
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moral stigma should result from refusing to follow the law. Put differently,
it challenges the positivist to account for the origin of law's binding force
- if law derives its force from its source, why are we bound by that
source? Can the virtue of law-abidingness ever be justified on purely posi-
tivist grounds? Thus, although Socrates's argument is unsound, it is never-
theless fruitful for the reader's - and the Companion's - consideration, as
it establishes the burden that the legal positivist must meet.
B. The Argument's Aftermath: Law as Aspirational
There may, however, be further insight to gain from this argument. Let
us examine the syllogism in light of what follows it. In addressing the
g'aipoq's concern about the seeming diversity of allegedly objective laws,
Socrates repeats his initial definition of law: "Law tends nonetheless to be
discovery of reality., 32 The repetition is not completely faithful to the
original statement, however - Socrates first formulates his statement as 6
v6goq tpa f3oip5Xutt Toi 6vToq eivat Etpvcn~. 33 His second statement is
slightly different: 3oOx6rai gv o,6v kTrov 6 v6ito; dvcu roi5 6vToq
s6pc(yl. 34 Several differences are worthy of remark: most noticeably,
the second formulation adds the insistent phrase o-66& irtov, "none the
less." Socrates is responding to his interlocutor's doubt of his formulation
with insistent vigor. More subtly and more interestingly, the syntax of the
parallel wording has changed: whereas the initial formulation begins with
the invocation of v6goq, the second, insistent formulation moves the
"hedging" word P0OX at ["tends"] to the very beginning of his sentence.
This positioning puts three-fold stress on the word Poii rrat. First, Greek's
flexible syntactic system uses word order to indicate stress - in the Greek
sentence structure, the initial word holds a place of particular emphasis.35
Second, as in English, the use of the phrase "none the less" [o6O&v 'jrov]
both causes the reader/speaker to pause and throws emphasis backwards;
its use here thus further highlights the importance of OiXETct. 36 Finally,
Socrates's emphatic use of f306 Xat comes immediately after the Compa-
nion's omission of the word in his parroting of Socrates's formulation.37
With the syntactical emphases exaggerated, their conversation runs as fol-
lows:
[315A] Socrates: Law tends [Pol?5xrctt] to be the discovery of reality.
Companion: ... if law is the discovery of reality, [Companion objects to
justified by reference to some sovereign, lest law's validity be premised on recursion.
32. PLATO, Minos, supra note 1, at 315a7.
33. Id. at 315a3.
34. Id. at 315a7.
35. HARDY HANSEN & GERALD QUINN, GREEK: AN INTENSIVE COURSE 30 (1998).
36. Cf H.W. SMYTH, GREEK GRAMMAR 630 (1920).
37. PLATO, Minos, supra note 1, at 315a4-5.
20101
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law's variety] ...
Socrates: [It] tends [30of)0Tzat] none the less, the law, to be the/a discovery
of reality, but... [Socrates answers objection.]
Given the stress laid upon it by the author of the Minos, this word's
meaning and its import as used by Socrates both merit our attention. Al-
though certainly correct, Lamb's translation of p3o64at as "to tend" may
mislead the reader into interpreting the author's use of the word P106oXat
as adding a probabilistic element to Socrates's statement (as when we say
"it tends to rain in March," meaning that it often rains in March). In fact,
the central meaning of the verb P3o5olic is "to will, wish, be willing."
Lamb's "tends" then is more properly the "tends" of Dr. Johnson's "To be
happy at home is the ultimate result of all ambition, the end to which
every enterprise and labor tends. .."38 The emphasis laid on P3064zat,
then, underscores that law's relationship with "the discovery of reality" is
an aspirational one.
As Socrates explains, law's "wish" to conform to reality may sometimes
be in vain. That is, he gives the obvious rejoinder to the Companion's ob-
jection that law - if it truly conforms to objective reality - should be uni-
form, rather than diverse: men are not always able to discover that which
the law wishes to discover - reality - and hence there is variation in law.
This emphasis on law's diversity - and on that diversity as a consequence
of the failure to discover reality - accords beautifully with Socrates's syn-
tactic emphasis on law's "wish"; law is unified not by its discovery of re-
ality, but only by its aspiration to discover reality.
Though they appear in the aftermath of a failed syllogism, Socrates's
restatements of his definition of law serve both to clarify his first argument
and to foreshadow more robust argumentation later in the dialogue. To set
the stage for this elaboration, we should consider how the notion of law as
aspirational - as something that "wishes" - could possibly aid in the rebut-
tal of legal positivism.
What does it mean for law to be aspirational? To aspire is to tend to-
wards some end (even an un-reached or unreachable end). To tend towards
an end, a thing must have an end. Only things that are unified - things that
have natures - have ends [rTXot]. That is, the kind of thing that has a na-
ture is the sort of thing that can fulfill that nature better or worse; things
with natures "aspire to" (in the non-anthropomorphic sense of "being or-
dered to") fulfill those natures.
By way of example, the growth of an apple is ordered towards the ful-
fillment of its apple nature - all manner of bruising, worms, and missha-
penness may get in the way, but as it grows, an apple tends towards the
round redness (or greenness) that is the fulfillment of apple nature. Any
deviation from that end will be seen as just that: a deviation or missing of
38. Samuel Johnson, Rambler #68 (Nov. 1750).
[Vol 22:83
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol22/iss1/3
McCusker
the mark. Things with a nature, then, "aspire" towards the fulfillment of
that nature - a goal which they may or may not achieve. Not all sorts of
things have a nature - or, at least, a nature qua that thing; some sorts of
things are, rather, categories. Such things do not aspire: the set of all ob-
jects that weigh three pounds includes objects that - without any inner co-
herence or any other similarity between the objects - have a certain mass.
There is no manner in which these objects can excel or fail in their weigh-
ing of three pounds. Objects that weigh a little over three or a little under
three pounds are not deficient three-pound objects (unless, like the bag of
flour sold to the customer as containing precisely three pounds of flour,
they have an external reason to "aspire" to that category) - they are simply
not members of the category.
The distinction between law as envisioned by the Companion and law as
envisioned by Socrates tracks this distinction between kinds with natures
and mere categories. In Socrates's view, law is tethered to the good and,
hence, aspirational: it has the unified nature that comes from its being or-
dered towards the discovery of reality. When it fails to discover reality, it
is somehow deficient as law. Law as envisioned by the ftxapog, however,
is a category - it is the 8&y ta n6?xcog or 864a noktruc-'. 3 It takes its "uni-
ty" not from any internal coherence, but only from a source: the City.
Thus, it does not aspire and cannot fail - any purported "law" that actually
stems from the City simply falls into the category of law. Any seeming
"law" not stemming from the City falls outside that category and hence
fails as law.
Socrates's focus on aspiration thus brings to light a key difference be-
tween his view of law and the Companion's. Indeed, however incomplete
Socrates's arguments may be, his concept of law as having a nature de-
fined by an aspirational end seems more tenable than the Companion's
conception of law as a category of statements defined by their source. For
if law is defined solely by its source in the City, how should it be distin-
guished from other emanations from the City?' If the City passes a reso-
lution saying the sky is blue (or, as sometimes happens, condemning the
conduct of another sovereign, without taking or calling for any action), is
such a law? The problem becomes starker in the case of a monarchy:
which utterances of the King are law and which are simply his speaking
without law-making? 4
39. Id.at3l4cl-3.
40. Nor is Socrates free from this criticism: if law tends to discover reality, how should it be dis-
tinguished from other things - most obviously, philosophy - which tend to discover reality?
41. I take this objection to be closely akin to one of H.L.A. Hart's critiques of John Austin's pri-
mitive command-and-sanction positivism, namely, that the person of the sovereign seems less the so-
vereign than does his office: "Finally, the analysis of law in terms of the sovereign, habitually obeyed
and necessarily exempt from all legal limitation, failed to account for the continuity of legislative au-
thority characteristic of a modem legal system, and the sovereign, person, or persons could not be
identified with either the electorate or the legislature of a modem state." H.L.A. Hart, Law as the Un-
ion of Primary and Secondary Rules, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds.,
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That the Minos's author is aware of this tension becomes clear when we
notice a key linguistic shift: Socrates reframes the Companion's 86yyat
r6Xscoq as 864a tok ctrtf. The former, the Companion's formulation, is
well-suited to glossing over the difficulty: 86yita can mean both "opinion"
and "resolution," thereby allowing the Companion to incorporate both
law's source and the idea of law as directive in a single word. Socrates's
gloss, however, does not maintain the same dual function: "864a" can
connote no sense closer to directive than "judgment," and even that is in
the sense most akin to "a philosophic opinion." His word choice subtly
suggests the difficulty of defining law purely as a sovereign pronounce-
ment without regard to the aim or purpose of that pronouncement.
Thus, while the Dialogue's first argument is flawed, Socrates's sugges-
tion that the concept of law is predicated on the existence of some unify-
ing end seems sound. Of course, not all positivists need join the Compa-
nion in taking law to be a category rather than a kind. A more
sophisticated positivist could instead maintain that law has a unified end
- to order society, perhaps - analytically independent of the good or
noble. Nonetheless, the first argument of the Dialogue, however falla-
cious, succeeds in refraining the debate about the nature of law around two
key questions: (1) what unifying end, or TkXo;, is definitive of law's na-
ture? and (2) what property of law explains the virtue of lawfulness? We
will see that Socrates answers both questions over the course of the Minos
by developing a conception of law's nature as unified around an end that
is deeply interconnected with man's (fixed) nature.
Let us now turn to Socrates's second argument.
II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE HEAVY
In answer to the Companion's objection to Socrates's characterization
of law as a (unified) whole tending towards the discovery of truth, So-
crates proposes further study of the question of whether there are, in fact,
variations in law. On Socrates's suggestion that they explore whether law
actually varies, the Companion expounds at length on the differences in
burial customs and attitudes towards human sacrifice between Greek and
non-Greek cities, among Greek cities, and even between current Athenians
and the Athenians of the past. Socrates reprimands him for making long
speeches and suggests a joint inquiry [cowV6v O-Kct ta] to which the
2008). Joseph Raz has attempted to solve the dilemma of when the sovereign's speech constitutes law
through what others have termed his "Instantiation Thesis," whereby a law must be the kind of thing
that is "capable of possessing authority." See Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 63 THE
MONIST 300 (July 1985). Regardless of the merits of the Instantiation Thesis, Raz's formula-
tion changes law from a category to a kind of thing possessing a nature. Under his theory, law qua law
must at least "claim that it possesses legitimate authority" in order to serve as a reason for action. Id.
Insofar as that claim may be convincing and justifiable to a greater or lesser degree, law may succeed
or fail as such.
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tatpo accedes.4 2 This joint inquiry becomes Socrates's second argument.
A. A Second Fallacious Argument
The text of the argument, which has received little praise from critics, is
as follows:
[315E] Socrates: Come then, do you consider just things to be unjust and
unjust things just, or, rather, just things to be just and unjust things unjust?
Companion: I consider just things to be just and unjust things unjust.
[316A] Socrates: And they are considered so among all men elsewhere as
they are here?
Companion: Yes.
Socrates: Among the Persians as well?
Companion: Also among the Persians.
Socrates: Always?
Companion: Indeed.
Socrates: Are things that weigh more considered to be heavier here, and
things that weigh less to be lighter, or the opposite?
Companion: No, the things that weigh more are considered to be heavier,
and the things that weight less lighter.
Socrates: And is it thus both in Carthage and Lycaea?
Companion: Yes.
Socrates: And noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble
and shameful things shameful, not shameful things noble and noble things
shameful?
[316B] Companion: Quite.
Socrates: Thus, to generalize to all cases, what is so is accepted as being so,
not what is not so, both among us and among all other people.
Companion: It seems so to me.
Socrates: Whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.
Companion: When you put it thus, Socrates, the same things seem to be ac-
cepted as lawful by us and by other men always, but when I consider that we
42. PLATO, Minos, supra note 1, at 315e.
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do not stop changing our laws, I cannot be persuaded.
Socrates begins with the question: "Do you consider just things to be
unjust and unjust things just, or, rather, just things to be just and unjust
things unjust? '4 3 The Companion acquiesces to the latter, presumably as-
suming Socrates to be asking for a relatively uncontroversial restatement
of the law of non-contradiction: just is just and unjust unjust. We should
note, however, that his question could easily be construed as raising the
more substantive issue of whether the Companion is able to correctly iden-
tify just things and unjust things as just and unjust, respectively. With
prompting, the Companion further affirms the just to be the just always
and everywhere. Socrates moves on to ask whether things that weigh
scales down more are considered heavier, and things that weigh less ligh-
ter, or the contrary." Again, the Companion acquiesces and affirms the
statement to be true everywhere.
Socrates has now found two examples of truths that seem - both to the
ftcaipoq and to us - to hold universally, regardless of time and place. The
first of these, about just and unjust things, is an abstract (and tautological)
principle, while the second, about the heavier and lighter things, is both a
principle that could be applied abstractly and a concrete means of discern-
ing a property in a particular object - a means of tethering a principle to a
particular. Socrates continues: "And noble things, it would seem, are eve-
rywhere considered noble, and shameful things shameful; not shameful
things noble or noble things shameful,"45 making the substantive and bold
assertion that all men everywhere can unerringly identify the noble and the
shameful.
Socrates thus concludes from the fact that all men everywhere acknowl-
edge the principle that just things are just and the fact that all men every-
where can tell that the heavier thing is heavier, that all men everywhere
can agree which things are noble. The argument as written is fallacious; it
holds if and only if nobility is a quality that is both as objective and as eas-
ily and universally discernible as heaviness, an assertion that Socrates
does not prove, though it calls for proof. The argument's problems only
become more grievous as he goes on to his final steps: "Thus, to general-
ize to all cases, what is so is accepted as being so, not what is not so, both
among us and among all other people"46 and, finally, "Whoever fails to
attain reality, fails to attain accepted law."47 Socrates has thereby moved
43. Id. at 315e7-9.
44. Id. at 316a4-5.
45. Id. at 316a8-316b2.
46. Id. at 316bi-4. William Cobb's translation of this passage, "So, to sum it all up, it is recog-
nized as lawful, both by us and by everyone else, that what is is not what is not" (Cobb, supra note 7,
at 196), is simply not possible, since the negation of) precedes t pif 6vrct and not elvt. SMYTH, supra
note 36, at 609.
47. PLATO, Minos, supra note 1, at 316b5.
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from the (already contestable) proposition that the identity of the noble is
agreed upon by all men to the conclusion that the truth is both known and
agreed upon by all men, increasing the gap between what his premises ac-
tually prove and what he infers from them. In the end, his missing pre-
mise is the ambitious one that all of reality is objective and both knowable
and known by all men at all times.
Without this premise, the whole argument fails. Why, then, does the au-
thor leave the argument as is? Is it because, as Heidel suggests, the author
does not even realize how sophistic his argument is? This seems unlikely.
Once again, as after the previous argument, the Companion does not fully
assent to the conclusion that Socrates reaches from the premises already
affirmed: "When you put it thus, Socrates, the same things seem to be ac-
cepted as lawful by us and by other men always, but when I consider that
we do not stop changing our laws, I cannot be persuaded. '48 Moreover,
this comparison between the heavy [r6v Papb], the just [-6v 8iicatov] and
the noble ['6v KaX v] is not an isolated instance in the Platonic corpus; ra-
ther, it has an almost exact parallel in the Euthyphro. There, Socrates ex-
plicitly draws a distinction between the heavier, about which disputes can
easily be solved by weighing,4 9 and the just and unjust, noble and shame-
ful, and good and bad, about which we "cannot reach any satisfactory
agreement" when we disagree.5" Plato, then, would have recognized the
argument as fallacious, as would any Platonic imitator as "able" as even
the Minos's detractors take its author to be.
B. The Argument's Import: Fair-Handedness and an Invitation to
Philosophy
Why, then, does the author present this argument and why does he
present it in this way? Perhaps because, as in the case of the first argu-
ment, the second argument points both the reader and the Talpoq down a
particular path of thinking. Two potential objectives manifest themselves.
First, the particular missing premise to the second argument - to which the
author draws our attention by its absence - is the very one which would be
necessary to support a strong natural law theory. That is, if all men always
and everywhere always completely comprehended the fullness of objec-
tive reality, the proposition that positive law is valid only when in confor-
mity with reality would become workable as a political reality. By throw-
ing this premise into relief, Socrates is in effect fair-handedly highlighting
potential problems with the alternative to the ratpo;'s conception of law,
as well as problems with the Traipo;'s own conception.
Second, through its ambiguity, the second argument acts as an invitation
to philosophy and a bridge to the second - I will argue - more seriously
48. Id. at 316b6-316c2.
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philosophical portion of the dialogue. That is, the very format of the
second argument leads one to ponder to what degree the missing premise
is true. Each of the argument's three premises (about the just, the heavy,
and the noble) is ambiguous. Without the Companion's ready assent, we
could easily think that the first statement should be construed not as "Do
you consider that it is true that just things are just?" but rather as "Do you
correctly identify the just things as being just things?" If the argument's
conclusion did not follow from a more substantive reading of the third
statement, that statement could just as easily be read not in the sense of
"Does everyone everywhere know which things are noble?" but in the
sense of "Does everyone everywhere know that it is true that noble things
are noble?" Indeed, it must be this ambiguity in each of the statements
which leads the Companion to agree so readily to a fallacious argument,
for if the statements were construed in their tautological sense, the argu-
ment they produced would be valid, if trivial. The tautological sense of the
propositions thus lends the argument a certain plausibility until the two
senses of each statement are carefully disambiguated. In reading and re-
reading the argument to judge in which sense each statement should be
taken, the reader is led as surely as the Companion to consider what un-
derstanding of the just, the heavy, and the noble would be necessary to
render not only the tautological version of the argument, but also a more
substantive reading, valid. The reader is led to ponder the degree to which
T6v 8iKatov and r6v K cX6v are like r6v 3api, and thus the degree to which
justice is objective and easily knowable. It is this concept that Socrates
will address in the rest of the dialogue, along with the missing premise of
the first argument - that law is good and the law-abiding are just.
Indeed, that this point marks the dialogue's turn towards serious argu-
ment is indicated by Socrates's shift in tone as he responds enigmatically
to his Companion's objection that law must change: "Perhaps you are not
considering that when pieces at checkers are moved they are still the same
pieces."'" The time has come to analyze law in a more profound way.
III. LEGISLATION AS A KINGLY ART
In the neglected middle portion of the dialogue, Socrates engages in a
series of extended analogies. While this extended analogies section has
been largely ignored by the few scholars who have written on the Minos
(save those few who have criticized its approval of kingly rule as "Alex-
andrian"),52 I will argue that the extended analogies - while hardly an
apodictic proof - are in fact the crux of the dialogue, and that the dialo-
gue's aims cannot be understood without understanding their import.
51. PLATO, Minos, supra note 1, at 316c3-5.
52. See HEtDEL, supra note 4.
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In order to defend the many controversial premises he put forth during
the arguments section of the dialogue, Socrates argues, as usual, from
what is better known to what is less well-known. That is, he starts with
other kinds of law-giving or governance and argues by analogy about the
nature of the law governing man. Specifically, he analogizes governance
of a city [n6&xov tpxt1v] to medicine,53 gardening, 4 and cookery." All
three of these arts are governed by internal laws. We can only conjecture,
but the laws of medicine [iarpucol v6 tOt] 6 might include the proposition
that antibiotics are useful in combating bacteria-based infections, the law
of gardening ["-rpnoupucoi v6got]57 that dahlias need lots of water, and the
laws of cooking [gayctpticoi v6gtot]58 that chocolate chip cookies should
bake until their edges are golden brown. In each case, the one who knows
these internal laws is the one who is able to perform the art, thereby go-
vern its subject correctly. In each of these cases, the performing of the art
is a matter not of will but of skill, of knowing how the object of the art
works and acting in accordance with that knowledge.
Socrates then makes the analogical leap from plants and cooking to hu-
mans: "Insofar as governance of a city, too, is an art, the success of any
governor will depend on whether his governance is based on the internal
logic - the laws, if you will - of men and of the r6Xtq. '59 The idea that
certain laws simply better fit the nature of the t6Xtq or human nature (laws
against murder, traffic laws, etc.) and that the natures of these beings sug-
gest those laws is perhaps the strongest argument that can be made against
legal positivism. Without offering an argument, then, Socrates has power-
fully challenged the Companion's notion of law. Just as a doctor who did
not understand the body would not be able to make his patients flourish
and might cause death rather than health, and a gardener who did not un-
derstand plants would not be able to cause them to flourish and would
produce brown gardens rather than green ones, so too a monarch who le-
gislated contrary to the nature of his subjects would produce a non-
functioning 7E6ktq. Socrates's leap from this argument to kingly rule6"
should not be taken as overly Alexandrian, but rather as suggesting to us
the Philosopher King - even if he does not explain the concept of the Phi-
losopher King to his unphilosophical Companion. Socrates's emphasis on
the kingly art expresses his esteem for wise rule, not his favor for the prac-
53. Id. at 316c.
54. Id. at 316e.
55. Id. at317a.
56. Id. at 316e2.
57. Id. at 316e6.
58. Id. at 316e10-11.
59. Id. at 317a4.
60. Id. at 317a8.
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tice of one-man rule based on dynastic birth.
Yet an analogy is not an argument. Has Socrates begged the question in
analogizing oi v6got n6X4oq with the laws of medicine, gardening, and
cookery? We noted that the concept Socrates needed to defend in order to
validate his previous arguments was three-fold: law as noble (or the law-
abiding person as just), man and the a6Xtq as having a fixed nature, and
that nature as being objectively discernible. But hasn't Socrates assumed
that men, like plants and cakes, have a fixed, easily discernible nature by
positing (without proving) that v6jtoq (in the sense of legislation, the laws
governing men) is a direct parallel to v6jto; (in the equivocal sense of the
internal logic of a substance, like the "laws" governing plant growth)?
Further, isn't he assuming that ruling men is in accordance with their na-
ture and hence good?
B. The Unity of Human Nature
Perhaps he is. But this, too, is part of Socrates's argument: we all recog-
nize that most substances known to us have a fixed nature (among these
are the human body, the garden, and the pastry) and that anyone seeking to
rule such a substance in the sense of cultivating it or causing it to flourish
would have to act in full knowledge of and in accord with that nature. By
showing that so many other kinds of rule presuppose a knowledge and
predicate their claim to rule on the possession of that knowledge, Socrates
claims common sense as an ally and shifts the burden of proof onto the de-
fender of legal positivism: man would indeed be radically different from
all other substances if he and his political community were the sort of
things whose governance required no attention to be paid to the kind of
things they are. Man would be markedly different from plants and the hu-
man body if the laws governing him (politically) were recognizable by vir-
tue of their source, rather than by their aspiration to suit human nature.
We see, too, how this notion of law ties in to the themes brought forth
by the two preliminary fallacious arguments: once law is viewed as part of
the art of governance of a being with a fixed nature - rather than as iso-
lated directives of a sovereign - law gains an aspiration. That is, its goal is
to discover, and govern according to, man's flourishing. Insofar as it does
that well, it will be successful law. Insofar as it disregards or mistakes
man's nature and needs, it will fail as law. Indeed, it will be impossible to
judge the merits of any individual law apart from a consideration of how it
would advance the flourishing of the humans governed by the law.
Further, it suggests a preliminary answer to the question of why one
should follow the law, by gesturing towards the possibility of a natural law
system - or, at least, a system governed by the Overlap Theory - in which
the citizenry would nonetheless be obliged to follow the positive law. That
is, if law is part of a system of governance ordered towards human flou-
rishing, we who wish to flourish have a prima facie compelling reason to
obey it. While there will, of course, be laws that don't truly tend towards
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flourishing - because of a defect of some kind on the part of the legislator
- the legal system as a whole will, in most cases, be ordered towards the
flourishing of the citizenry. And, in general, the citizenry will flourish bet-
ter in the presence of law than in its absence. This natural law defense of
following the law will not lead to slavish obedience; in situations where a
particular law is so out of accord with nature as to truly harm human flou-
rishing, or - as in the case of the Third Reich - when the entire legal sys-
tem has been so subverted away from the natural as to inhibit flourishing,
civil disobedience could still be warranted But, knowing that law is or-
dered towards flourishing, the citizen could plausibly take obedience as a
rule of thumb.
Does Socrates's defense of governance as a kingly art settle the question
entirely, then? It seems not. Socrates's analogies address the question of
whether man and politics have fixed natures, and make a preliminary de-
fense of the idea that those natures are objectively discernible. However,
that preliminary defense is not so extensive that it can even pretend to
demonstrate that the nature of man is so immediately understandable as
for v6[toq to be universally and unerringly correct. Indeed, this proposition
is too broad to be finally defensible. As we shall see, however, Socrates
engages in one further defense of it at the end of the Minos.
IV. MINOS OF CRETE AND ANCIENT LAW
The final section of the dialogue, and the section dismissed by critics as
both a non-sequitur and overly Alexandrian, comprises an homage to King
Minos of Crete as "a good lawgiver" based on his having established the
most ancient laws still in existence.6 At first glance, the connection be-
tween the final section and the rest of the dialogue is not clear - praise for
law on the grounds that it is ancient seems not to accord with the thought
that law ought to be judged on whether it discovers reality. And yet, the
foregoing analysis prepares the way for a coherent reading of the dialogue.
The dialogue's transition into its discussion of Minos of Crete provides
the key. First, Socrates and the Companion discuss the lawmakers with
true knowledge [oi 7UrGtJievot], and decide that such men would always
write the same things and never change what was lawful.62 Further, they
decide that if a ruler ever did change the content of the law, this would be
61. Id. at 318c.
62. Id. at 317b. We should assume that the Platonic author is referring to laws relating to matters
intrinsically connected to man's nature. He cannot be unaware that knowledge (and hence law) about
changeable objects must also be changeable. Throughout the Minos, he stresses the unchanging parts
of law and reality both, I take it, because he wishes to bring his limited interlocutor closer to the truth
and because the Minos is the dialogue specifically ordered towards determining the degree to which
law has access to reality. Perhaps the Minos's author shares Aristotle's opinion that there is no knowl-
edge of changeable things. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, Bk. VII, Ch. 15. Indeed, in some sense, I have
argued that that is precisely what is at stake in the dialogue: must law be connected to the (coherent)
nature of the thing governed, and hence, must it in some measure pertain to the unchanging?
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evidence that that ruler lacked true knowledge.63 Later, Socrates discusses
the best flute-players, decides on Marsyas and Olympus, and says of their
flute-tunes: "And even now they alone remain, as being divine."' In each
case, the quality of the art in question is tied to its longevity. While neither
is a proof that ancient law is good law, these two statements can indicate
the path our argument should take: the first reminds us that sometimes sta-
bility indicates that a thing has found the truth (and hence no longer needs
to seek for it). The second tells us what every building contractor insists:
quality can, on occasion, prevent decay.
Combining these two clues with the conception of law garnered from
the extended analogies section of the dialogue yields a potential reconcil-
iation between ancient law and good law in the form of a "legal natural se-
lection" of sorts. If Socrates is right that legislation is a kingly art fitted to
those who know the nature of men and their governance (as gardeners
know the nature of gardens), laws (like gardening techniques) will alert
their practitioners when they go horribly wrong by not "working" - by not
producing a functioning or flourishing society. By implication, laws that
endure will be laws that have correctly accessed some part of the reality
about man and the n6kig, whether by luck or by skill. This natural selec-
tion would not guarantee that only good laws endure. Rather, it would
suggest that any law lasting through the centuries had a certain claim to
accord tolerably well with human nature or with the nature of politics.
The Minos's defense of v6Ro; as good and as a discovery of reality,
then, is the product of a much larger and more ambitious view: that man
and politics are both io6aptov, both the sort of well-ordered things possess-
ing a fixed nature with which v6goq can either be in accord or in defiance.
In this view, v6go 's access to reality would come both from a sort of
"natural selection" away from false or bad v6jtot (when their contradiction
with man's or the n6ktq's nature becomes clear) and from the fact that
man's and the ni6Xt's natures - like the nature of animal bodies, plants,
and cakes - are not hidden, but merely constitute the sort of beings that
man and the n6kt are, and thus are observable. Praise of v6gxo as the dis-
covery of reality and praise of ancient v6.og are thus both of a piece with
a particular view of the nature of man and the nature of politics as fixed,
intelligible, and coordinated with one another. This view is the one advo-
cated by Socrates in his discussion of lawmaking as a kingly art and fore-
shadowed by his two fallacious arguments.
CONCLUSION
We are now finally in a position to understand the aims of the author of
the Minos. First, we can understand the role of the two fallacious argu-
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ments put forth by Socrates in the beginning of the dialogue, neither of
which seems quite so fallacious when supported by his later discussion of
law-making as a kingly art. The first argument tried to demonstrate that
v6pioq could not be simply the resolution of the city, 86yRta nt6Xscoq, by ar-
guing that the lawful, oi v6ptiot (and hence the law, or v6go;) are just,
while some resolutions of cities are evil. The argument seemed fallacious
because of the question-begging, rather than proven, premise that oi
v6titgot are just. We now see, however, that the entire dialogue is an ar-
gument against the position that v6go; is merely what man decides it is
and in favor of the idea that v6go; has a unified nature that is intimately
connected with man's nature, and hence with reality. Under the theory of
"legal natural selection," enduring law is more or less in accord with jus-
tice - if it weren't, it would fail to "work" and would fall - and those who
live "lawfully" are, more or less, just. Law is, then, not merely aspiration-
al, but has a built-in mechanism for self-correction when it errs too far
from accordance with human nature. The argument is far from airtight, but
it is stronger than it once appeared. More importantly, the argument shows
us the stakes raised by the question of whether law has a coherent unity (as
opposed to merely being the name of a category).
The second argument failed to establish the noble [r6v itX6v] and the
shameful [r6v aiyop6v] (and indeed, all of reality) as considered to be the
same by all men everywhere because it assumed T6v KaXrv was as objec-
tive and obvious as the heavy [Tv O3api]. If we construe T6v KcaXov as a
quality that makes men flourish, however, the dialogue will have sup-
ported this argument to some degree by arguing analogically that man's
flourishing is objective. However, even granting the premise that nobility
and baseness in man are objective, Socrates has in no way demonstrated
that this objective (but complicated) property will be as readily discernable
as the objective (but simple) property of heaviness. Perhaps we should not
judge Socrates too harshly, however: his definition of v6jio; was, after all,
that which "tends to be a discovering" [PoIXCtat tof 6v-ro; Mat
6psnct], and he has succeeded in showing through his extended analo-
gies section that he views law as part of a larger system of governance
which is ordered towards the fulfillment of man's nature. He views law,
then, as striving to understand and correctly govern man's nature - not as
always succeeding. In any case, we see that the two arguments dovetail
with the later discussion of legislation as a kingly art. That is, both argu-
ments serve to prepare the way for the later analogical discussion and its
corollaries by indicating to the reader which aspects of that argument to
focus on.
More broadly, the two arguments demonstrate the logical connection
between law's source of authority and reality's status as well-ordered. If
man and the n6ktq lack ordered, fixed natures, law can derive authority on-
ly from its source, from the lawmaker's power or claim to rule. In that
case, law is not a coherent kind of a thing with a goal it can obtain or fail
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to obtain, but is, rather, a category - that which the sovereign wills. If, on
the other hand, man and the universe are the sorts of things that can be the
objects of knowledge [7rtaTngji], law must share in that knowledge to me-
rit ruling and, according to the Minos, to be able to rule successfully. In
this case, law is aspirational - it is ordered towards the discovery of man's
nature and of human flourishing.
Socrates has tried in the course of the Minos, then, to expand the distinc-
tion between legal positivism and its alternative into two broader
worldviews. In his view, the legal positivist sees law not as a coherent
whole, but merely as a category: that which the sovereign ordains. So-
crates challenges this view on the grounds that it does not adequately ex-
plain why people are bound to obey law (why law-abidingness is a virtue).
Further, he faults legal positivism for its inability to explain why we eva-
luate laws as better or worse according to their contribution to (or deroga-
tion of) human flourishing. If laws are really just a category, it seems odd
that they would show a sort of inner coherence and striving that would in-
dicate that there might be such a thing as "good law" with a definition
wholly divorced from "law." Finally, Socrates thinks that legal positivism
simply does not take account of the degree to which actual laws are reflec-
tive of human nature, as a result of the inevitable failure (through "legal
natural selection") of laws in defiance of that nature. In Socrates's view,
only if it were true that man had no discernible political nature could legal
positivism offer a satisfactory account of law.
On the other hand, Socrates offers a vision of what an alternative to le-
gal positivism would look like. Under this natural law alternative, law re-
gulating human conduct in political community would be analogous to
other familiar systems of governance. Just as those who tend plants must
tend them in accordance with their nature lest they die, so those who go-
vern human beings must legislate in accordance with the nature of men,
lest the societies they govern fail. Ancient laws will often have a special
claim to truth precisely because they will have endured for such a length
of time without causing a failure of human flourishing.
According to the Minos, then, laws are not merely individual instances
of a category. Rather, they share a common nature unified by their aspira-
tion of knowing about and being in accordance with reality. Law is an at-
tempt to pattern the man-made after reality, grafted onto the societies of
men to aid them in their flourishing. This teaching is both subtle and cohe-
rent. Given that it seems to weave the three sections of the Minos into a
compelling narrative, the burden now shifts to those who doubt the au-
thenticity of the dialogue to make their case.
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